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abstract 
The thought that children should be given greater opportunity to participate meaningfully 
in affairs which concern them and to show their capacity for reasonable measured thoughts 
and choices has been displayed by many others (COHEN, 1980; FARSON, 1974; KENNEDY, 
1992). It has also been suggested than in order to ensure that we are fair to all individuals, 
regardless of their age, that our primary consideration should be the capacity for decision 
making and agency. However, whether or not children are indeed capable of this kind of 
decision-making and developed agency is greatly contested (most notably perhaps by Plato 
and Aristotle), and so too are the reasons for this. In what follows then, I will examine the 
ways in which children may be encouraged to gain this kind of agency, and what our role in 
facilitating this may be. Moreover, I will show that while difficult, it is possible to approach 
‘teaching’ young people to become autonomous agents in ways that do not interfere with 
their agency, either presently or in a future-oriented sense. Establishing this is essential as in 
order to make authentic choices, and allow for holding individuals responsible for their 
choices, they must be a result of the deliberation of their own choices, and not some other 
influence, be that external or internal. Finally, in relation to educative aims as a whole, I will 
follow Seneca’s statement above: that education should go beyond inculcating only learning 
and practises that are of immediate use to the institutions in which they are learned.  
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inculcando agência 
resumo 
O pensamento segundo o qual crianças devem receber maiores oportunidades de participar 
de maneira significativa em assuntos que lhes concernem e de mostrar sua capacidade para 
pensamentos e ações racionalmente deliberados tem sido mostrado por muitos outros 
(COHEN, 1980; FARSON, 1974; KENNEDY, 1992). Também tem sido sugerido que, para 
assegurar o fato de que somos justos com todos os indivíduos independentemente de suas 
idades, nossa primeira consideração deve ser a capacidade para a tomada de decisão e a 
agência. No entanto, o fato de as crianças serem ou não de fato capazes deste tipo de tomada 
de decisão e  de agência desenvolvida é altamente contestado (notadamente, talvez, por 
Platão e Aristóteles), assim como o são também as razões para isso. Assim, no que segue, eu 
irei examinar os modos pelos quais as crianças deveriam ser encorajadas a adquirir este tipo 
de agência, e qual deve ser o nosso papel em facilitar isto. Além disso, eu irei mostrar que, 
ainda que difícil, é ainda assim possível este acesso através do “ensinar” às pessoas jovens 
como tornarem-se agentes autônomos de uma maneira que não interfira em sua agência, 
nem em uma perspectiva presente, nem futura. Estabelecer isto é essencial, dado que, para 
poder realizar escolhas autênticas, e permitir assim que os indivíduos sejam 
responsabilizados por estas escolhas, elas devem ser o resultado da deliberação acerca de 
suas próprias escolhas, e não de qualquer outra influência, seja externa ou interna. 
Finalmente, em relação a objetivos educacionais em geral, seguirei a sentença acima, de 
Sêneca: de que a educação deve ir além de inculcar apenas aprendizados e práticas que são 
de uso imediato das instituições nas quais eles são aprendidos. 
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inculcando agencia 
resumen 
El pensamiento según el cual los niños y niñas deben recibir mayores oportunidades, para 
participar de forma significativa en asuntos que les conciernen y para mostrar su capacidad 
de pensamientos y acciones racionalmente deliberadas, ha sido mostrado por muchas 
personas (COHEN, 1980; FARSON, 1974; KENNEDY, 1992).  También ha sido sugerido que, 
para asegurar el hecho de que somos justos con todos los individuos independientes de sus 
edades, lo primero que debemos considerar es la capacidad del individuo de tomar 
decisiones y de agenciar. Sin embargo, el hecho de que los niños y niñas sean o no de hecho 
capaces de este tipo de toma de decisión y agencia es altamente cuestionado (de forma 
notoria, talvez, por Platón y Aristóteles), así como lo son también las razones para esto.  Así, 
a continuación, yo examinaré los modos por los cuáles los niños y niñas deberían ser 
encorajados a adquirir este tipo de agencia y cuál debe ser nuestro papel en facilitar esto. 
Además de eso, yo mostraré que, aunque es difícil, es posible el acceso a través del 
“enseñar” a las personas jóvenes como convertirse en agentes autónomos de una manera 
que no interfiera en su agencia, ni en su perspectiva presente, ni futura. Establecer esto es 
esencial, dado que para poder realizar elecciones auténticas y permitir así que los individuos 
sean responsabilizados por estas elecciones, ellas deben ser el resultado de la deliberación 
acerca de sus propias elecciones y no de cualquier otra influencia sea interna o externa. 
Finalmente, en relación a objetivos educaciones en general, seguiré la sentencia, 
parafraseando a Séneca: de que la educación debe ir más allá de inculcar aprendizajes y 
prácticas que son para uso inmediato en las instituciones en las que ellas han sido 
aprendidas. 
 
palabras clave: autonomía; agencia; educación. 
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 inculcating agency 
 
“Non scholae, sed vitae discimus 
[We learn for life, not for school]” 
(Seneca, 1965; xiv). 
 
can we ‘teach’ agency? 
Aristotle’s view was that it made no sense to educate the young in certain 
disciplines,  
a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is 
inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from 
these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, 
his study will be vain and unprofitable. (ARISTOTLE, 1998, p. 3). 
But the young to whom Aristotle is referring here is not necessarily what we 
may expect. He remarks “it makes no difference whether he is young in years or 
youthful in his character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living” 
(ARISTOTLE, 1998, p. 4). 
Suggesting that only those who are in a position to appreciate the material 
they are being presented with be given the opportunity to study it makes sense – 
after all there is little point in teaching those who haven’t the faintest idea about 
what it is they are being taught. I could, for example, demand that I have access to 
lectures on mathematics but it would make very little sense for me to do since I 
would not be able to even begin to comprehend that which I was being told. This is 
certainly true of advanced mathematics and I think I would be rightly turned away 
were I to send a request to a lecturer of mathematics requesting to attend lectures or 
receive tuition. The same, though, cannot be said of the basic maths instruction I 
received whilst at school. “Not to be able to read or write or count or communicate is 
a tremendous deprivation ... [and]... the first and most immediate contribution of 
successful school education is a direct reduction of this basic deprivation” (SEN, 
2003). The difference between what may be described as further and fundamental 
education is that in the former case, it is reasonable for the disseminators of the 
information we are seeking to request that we demonstrate that we are able to 
comprehend and thus benefit from the tutelage that they will provide us, where in 
the latter instance it is unquestionable that we will benefit from a basic standard of 
education.  
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With basic, fundamental, education the point is not that we must demonstrate 
our prowess in our chosen field in order to be given the opportunity to progress and 
learn more, but that we should be given the opportunity to learn fundamental skills 
and furthermore be given the opportunity to develop our thinking. Not only this, 
but we must be able to develop those skills that are necessary for us to live a “good 
life” (ARISTOTLE, 1998). We have then a definition as to what the primary 
objectives of basic education should be: to reduce the basic deprivation that occurs 
from the absence of skills that are needed for a basic standard of living, and to allow 
us, if we desire and are capable, to progress beyond this basic standard. In short, we 
must endeavour to help individuals become autonomous developed agents capable 
of self determination. 
 
the problem with inculcating agency 
If we are too prescriptive in our measures of teaching the undeveloped agent 
to think autonomously and freely, then we run the risk of negating that very 
autonomy before it has even had the chance to emerge. As John Dewey put it: 
“personality cannot be procured for anyone, however degraded and feeble, by 
anyone else, however wise and strong” (DEWEY, 1969, p. 244). 
As Cuypers and Haji (2006) identify, one of the principal aims of any 
educative process should be to “ensure that...children develop into autonomous 
critical thinkers” (CUYPERS; HAJI, 2006, p. 723). 
A well-known definition of critical thinking comes from Harvey Siegel, who 
defines it as 
(1) the ability to reason well, i.e. to construct and evaluate the various 
reasons which have been or can be offered in support or criticism of 
candidate beliefs, judgments, and actions; and (2) the disposition or 
inclination to be guided by reasons so evaluated, i.e. actually to believe, 
judge, and act in accordance with the results of such reasoned evaluations. 
(SIEGEL, 2003, p. 305). 
Furthermore, for a critical thinker, such reasons will appropriately move an 
individual in their thought and action. This appropriate motivation involves both 
the realisation of the importance of those reasons and also the ability to recognise the 
evidential force of such reasons in guiding their thoughts and actions. Centrally, 
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critical thinking involves the acknowledgement of the binding power of universals, 
and the ability to think and act in accordance with such universals (BAILIN; SIEGEL, 
2003, p. 183-186) 
Because of such a definition of critical thinking, such a state is not an all-or-
nothing one. It is very possible for an individual to have the ability to critically 
evaluate reasons for action, but to fail to do so in a systematic way, making them a 
less effective critical thinker than someone who can systematically and consistently 
do so. Siegel goes further than this in outlining his account of the critical thinker; not 
only must the aforementioned pre-requisites of critical thinking be fulfilled, but the 
critical thinker must also have the disposition to seek reasons in support or criticism 
of their ‘candidate beliefs’ and must engage readily (and actually) in the assessment 
of such reasons. Essentially, Siegel’s account of the critical thinker can be 
summarised by saying that the process of becoming a critical thinker involves 
becoming a certain type of person and not just by learning how to do something. The 
result of this is that when aiming to educate critical thinkers (or developed agents) 
then we must aim not simply for children to be able to think critically, but more 
fundamentally for them to be critical thinkers. 
 
avoiding indoctrination 
Having outlined critical thinking and developed agency as an identity-
constituting ideal, we must now turn to explore how the ability to be a developed 
agent may be inculcated in an autonomous fashion. Fundamentally, we have to 
avoid making children autonomous in ways that may compromise that very ideal – 
to avoid the criticism of education as Cicero saw it: “obest plerumque iis qui discere 
volunt, auctoritas eorum qui docent” (most commonly, the authority of those who teach 
hinders those that would learn) (CICERO, 2003, p. 1i).  
The reason why an end result of autonomy that is not achieved in an 
autonomous way is undesirable may not at first be apparent, however, by forming a 
strict outline of what constitutes indoctrination, I will show that we must not only 
help individuals become autonomous, but must do so in a way that respects their 
current autonomy as much as is possible. 
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A helpful way to begin our definition of indoctrination is to outline what it is 
not. Autonomy includes choice, authenticity and rationality; and in relation to our 
current question such autonomy must relate not just to the possession of ideals, but 
to their acquisition as well. The reason why indoctrination is to be avoided is 
because it compromises this free acquisition of ideals, even the ideal or ability to be 
an autonomous thinker. At its core, indoctrination involves the inculcation of beliefs 
which are non-evidential, and as we saw from Siegel, evidence based reasons for 
decisions is a central component of critical thinking – so much so that if we attempt 
to indoctrinate critical thinkers, then it ceases to be critical thinking at all. But the 
importance of autonomy as an educational ideal and as the natural opposite to 
indoctrination goes beyond simply ensuring autonomous choosers. As Dearden 
writes; 
the development of autonomy as an educational aim … is the development 
of a kind of person whose thought and action in important areas of his life 
are to be explained by reference to his own choices, decisions, reflections, 
deliberations—in short, his own activity of mind. (DEARDEN, 1972, p. 70). 
The most important part of Dearden’s  notion of autonomy as an educational 
aim is that one’s basis for thought must be one’s own and nobody else’s – our choices 
and thoughts must be authentic as well as guided by rational reasons to be truly 
autonomous. After all, I may adopt your reasons for an action and they may well be 
good, well-thought out, rational reasons, but unless I subject them to scrutiny of my 
own, they cannot be said to be my reasons as well as yours, however good they may 
be.  Indoctrination compromises this authenticity by permanently disabling an 
individual’s ability to think, believe, or act according to their own reasons, even if 
the individual in question thinks that they are their own reasons. The idea that one 
can simultaneously think that one is motivated by one’s own reasons for action, and 
yet not be may seem rather counter-intuitive, and is a particular problem since 
reason is to some extent self justifying – reason is exactly what our thoughts and 
actions should be based on.  However, my objection to non-authentic reasons can be 
made clearer by distinguishing between true agency, and proto-agency.  
Proto-agents may be distinguished from true agents in the sense that they will 
be non-autonomous about their beliefs in both the way that they acquire and 
continue to possess them. A proto-agent may well be able to respond to a question or 
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problem by giving reasons, but when pressed about the cause of such reasons may 
fail to provide an answer which involves their autonomous holding of such a belief 
(a difference of responding with “so-and-so says this” or “because I have been told” 
rather than “I think this, because...”). A proto-agent may then be characterised as 
being enslaved by the reasons of others, rather than freely acting in accordance with 
their own. To be classed as a true agent, we must act on our own reasons, not those 
of others. One important way in which we can make the received reasons of others 
truly our own is to subject them to our own scrutiny: “sibi quisque se vindicet” 
(everyone must challenge himself, so that he may at least know that he knows) 
(SENECA, 1965, xxxiii). 
 
open futures 
Indoctrination and manipulation are clearly to be avoided, but how much 
autonomy can realistically be extended to an educative process?  Should the aim be 
to educate children so that they will as adults have as many options open to them as 
possible – a ‘maximally open’ future? Or should the child’s future be more 
specifically shaped in directions that we ourselves endorse? 
Perhaps the most well-known supporter of the ‘maximising’ principle is Joel 
Feinberg. In The Child’s Right to an Open Future, he argues that children have 
“anticipatory autonomy rights” (FEINBERG, 1992, p. 76-97). These rights, says 
Feinberg, are violated when a child’s future options are prematurely closed, and 
honoured when these future options are kept open. According to Feinberg, we 
should send a child “out into the adult world with as many open opportunities as 
possible, thus maximising his chances for self-fulfilment” (FEINBERG, 1992, p. 84). 
At first glance, this is an attractive prospect. Even though we want children to 
grow into adults, we do not want to decree what sort of adults they will be. Indeed, 
since the aim should be for a child to be an autonomous adult, we should encourage 
them to be adults who can make their own choices as to what sort of person they 
will be, and what endeavours they themselves choose to pursue. In stipulating too 
strongly or too early what they should focus on, we may irreversibly close some 
doors for them, even if we are only trying to open others. 
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There are two main objections to this ‘maximising’ principle. One is that 
attempting to approach children’s futures in such a way does little more than make 
many paths inaccessible to the child in any fundamental way by trying to keep them 
all open. Feinberg’s encapsulation of an open-future requires that we must give the 
child as many opportunities as possible. Let us consider a child whose parents are keen 
for them to be able to ‘try everything’.  In pursuing too many activities, each activity 
is devalued. Moreover, we can never be good at anything if we are constantly under 
pressure to do everything. Thus, any supposed benefit received from this approach 
is lost by the necessary shallow-ness of our relationship with each endeavour. Even 
if we show prowess and enjoyment for any one thing, we are still compelled to go 
off and try something else. The other objection is that in ‘trying everything’, our 
hypothetical child does nothing more than become a machine with a duty to turn 
their hand to everything so as not to deny themselves any future possibility - having 
football practise on a Monday, violin lessons on a Tuesday, dance on a Wednesday, 
and so on, to the point where they are no longer allowed any time to enjoy being a 
child, to play or relax (something they would themselves likely choose to do). 
Encouraging maximum choices in the future disregards the child as important right 
now, instead favouring only that which they may become. 
Raz (1986) offers a more temperate formulation of the maximising principle 
suggesting that while it is important to increase choices this does not entail 
maximising such choices indefinitely. For Raz it is the range of choice and not the 
number of choices that are of import: ‘‘A choice between hundreds of identical and 
identically situated houses is no choice, compared with a choice between a town flat 
and a suburban house, for example” (RAZ, 1986, p. 375). Yet ultimately, this notion 
is no more helpful than Feinberg’s maximising principle. It is not clear how we are to 
interpret the difference between a range of choices as opposed to a myriad of 
identical choices. Of course in some cases it will be obvious that there is a significant 
difference between two choices. Raz’s town flat and suburban house or a child’s 
pursuit of sports or music constitutes an easily distinguishable range of choice. But 
other choices are not so clear – is a north-facing flat too similar to a south-facing one 
of the same design, or playing rugby too similar to playing football, to constitute an 
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adequate range of choice? How are we to interpret the content of these choices so as 
to adhere to Raz’s assertion? If some decisions are too similar to be of use to Raz’s 
system of choice, then does this mean that we are driven to offer choices that are 
maximally different, just for the sake of offering an adequate range of choice?  For 
example, Raz’s town flat and suburban house are different, but not as different as a 
yurt or a tree-house. Are we then pressed to entertain these as real possibilities as an 
abode? In the case of children, the choice to pursue music or sports constitutes less of 
a range of choice than the choice to be destitute, or to join a guerrilla army, but 
surely we cannot endorse giving children ‘a taste’ of such a life just so they can see if 
they like it or not. The fundamental problem with Raz’s suggestion that range of 
choice must be increased is that it is generally unhelpful because it is so difficult to 
appraise what this may mean in any real applicable way. Moreover, it could easily 
be interpreted in ways that are clearly unhelpful to a child’s future wellbeing. 
It is most often assumed that parents have their children’s best interests at 
heart. But are we to conclude that this always makes them the best judges of which 
directions to guide their children? How can we protect the child from an overbearing 
parent who tries to push their child to achieve things that the parent and not the 
child endorse? One answer may be to appeal not just to the child’s future autonomy, 
but to the child’s present autonomy. Although it may be argued that (especially 
young) children lack more than the simple display of preferences, there is no saying 
that this cannot suffice to allow them to dissent from pursuing certain activities. 
When talking about basic education though, we must measure the detrimental effect 
that allowing the child to refuse to participate in educational activities will have. For 
example, no matter how much a child may hate reading, this does not mean that we 
should cease to strongly encourage them do so, since illiteracy in later life will 
undoubtedly have a more profound negative impact than will the lack of enjoyment 
they experience whilst learning. Moreover, it is likely that our hope is that they will 
come to appreciate reading the more of it that they do. In terms of other activities 
however, this obligation is not apparent. Staying with the sporting analogy, we are 
not bound to force a child to play football even though it could be argued that doing 
so will allow them to make a handsome living in their adult years. The point is that 
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reading is a fundamental skill in the same way that sporting prowess is not. All told, 
in regards to ‘open futures’, we should be guided by the principle that we should 
allow the child to develop future interests not maximally, nor by what we would 
choose for them – but instead by actually listening to children, and developing skills 
and keeping the paths open which the children themselves show enthusiasm 
towards pursuing. The child then should be educated not only to an open future of 
self-fulfilment, but to a more fulfilling life right now and in the future which they can 
carry with them into adulthood, on their own terms. 
 
autonomy in learning as well as from it? educative democracy 
We may fail children by giving them a maximally open future (and not just 
for pragmatic reasons) and so clearly some limit on what is offered is not only 
inevitable, but necessary. The question of what that limit should be still remains. If 
the aim is to foster autonomy in the future and also to honour the autonomous 
individual in the present, then we may be tempted to suggest that the best way to 
educate children is to allow them to choose what they learn and in what manner; or 
indeed to allow them to reject some forms of education altogether. Though in some 
instances we may want to allow the freedom to choose one programme of education 
over another, this cannot be the case when we are talking about fundamental 
education. The reason for this is that an individual may reject any education 
whatsoever. Strongly autonomous education which allows anyone to reject it may 
give the child less than they need or deserve from their education, but even so we 
still do not want to be left with our only choice being to indoctrinate children, even if 
it is for their own good.  
We can, however, conceive a weaker educational autonomy that manages to 
reconcile the notions of honouring present autonomy and inculcating future capacity 
for autonomy. For an individual to be said to have views autonomously, these views 
must be both acquired and held autonomously. A child may reasonably be said to be 
autonomous with respect to the acquisition of a belief - even an instilled one – if its 
acquisition does not subvert responsibility for any actions which issue from that 
belief. Furthermore, in respect of autonomously possessing beliefs, an agent is 
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autonomous iff throughout the period of the possession of that belief the agent in 
question is capable of rejecting that belief and thus avoids the continued holding of 
those beliefs being a product of indoctrination. Lastly, we must be sure in order for 
an agent to be autonomously influenced by a desire that they have the ability to act 
(or not to act) freely upon such an influence. 
 
education as ushering the child into that which is considered good 
The reason why allowing an individual to turn their back on education would 
be a mistake is because of the fundamental aim of education – ushering the child into 
that which is ‘good’. Hitherto we have seen (from Sen) that one fundamental aim of 
education should be to reduce the disadvantages suffered by individuals who do not 
receive a basic standard of education, and from Dearden that autonomy should be 
an aim of any educative system. What both of these views about education have in 
common is that they are both concerned with initiating children into those things 
which are considered good. That autonomy is a good thing, and that avoiding the 
deprivation of a lack of basic education is also good I take to be uncontroversial. 
Furthermore, by categorising the over-arching aim of education thus it allows us to 
make more prescriptive statements about what is considered a good focus for 
education. It also avoids the problems associated with a totally free educative 
process that were outlined above. 
Underpinning all of the above is the thought that all education must be 
authentic. An authentic education must at heart be forward-looking, not least because 
of the necessary interference on the part of the educators. What preserves this 
authenticity is instilling the abilities to autonomously possess and be influenced by 
those things which we are taught and, on a weaker conception of autonomy, to 
receive those ideas in an autonomous fashion. Essentially, although driven by the 
outside forces of education and its educators, the process of learning must be an 
internal one. As Feinberg (1986) writes: 
Always the self that contributes to the making of the newer self 
is the product both of outside influences and an earlier self that 
was not quite as fully formed… At every subsequent stage the 
immature child plays a greater role in the creation of his own 
life, until...he is at last fully in charge of himself. [...] Perhaps 
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we are all self-made in the way just described, except those 
who have been severely manipulated, indoctrinated, or coerced 
throughout childhood. (FEINBERG, 1986, p. 34). 
But even though we may be ‘self-made’ in the way described above, Feinberg 
still asserts that we cannot do this independently, even if we may do so autonomously 
and authentically.  “The self we have created in this way for ourselves will not be an 
authentic self unless the habit of critical self-revision was implanted in us early” 
(FEINBERG, 1986, p. 35, Italics added). It is this distinction that is of most 
importance here – we must not confuse autonomous education with independent 
education. 
 
is self determination theory the answer? 
How might we go about setting up the kind of environment that would allow 
us to foster an autonomous approach to education, while at the same time still 
salvaging the notion that there are at least some things that are undeniably essential 
for us to know, even if we disagree? One answer may come from Self-Determination 
Theory (SDT) (DECI; RYAN, 2000).   
Self-determination essentially states that there are two fundamental types of 
motivation when determining why an individual is choosing to engage in this or 
that educative task: these are either autonomous or controlled, and as Deci and Ryan 
explain, much of the theory has emerged from work examining the effect of extrinsic 
reward on intrinsic motivation (HEIDER, 1958; CHARMS, 1968; DECI, 1971). Within 
the broader notion of autonomous or controlled motivators, a spectrum of 5 types of 
motivation emerges, ranging from what are considered to be the least, to the most 
autonomous. These motivators are external (according to Deci & Ryan, the least 
autonomous) introjected, identified, integrated and intrinsic (the most autonomous form 
of motivation).  
An external motivation is that which is entirely governed by outside forces, 
and what we can get (or avoid) by performing a given action. In the case of 
education, we may complete our homework is order to avoid the punishment meted 
out by failing to do so, or else may put in extra effort with our work to win a prize.  
andrew divers 
childhood & philosophy, rio de janeiro, v. 13, n. 27, maio-ago. 2017, pp. 253-270       issn 1984-5987       265 
 SDT also states that students possess three basic psychological needs within 
their experience of education: autonomy, competence and relatedness (DECI; RYAN, 
2000).  
That someone engages in an activity because they enjoy it is a firm indicator 
that they have freely chosen that activity, and that their decision is autonomous. 
Even in the instance of controlled motivation, there is enough of a choice that students 
are given that allows us to view their actions as autonomous. Desiring a reward is a 
simple indicator of one’s being able to choose: if one is not sufficiently interested in 
the reward being offered, then it is reasonable to presume that at least some pupils 
will decline doing the activity which leads to the proposed reward. Even in the case 
of a more punitive motivation to read being offered - there is still enough of a choice 
(provided the punishment is not overly harsh) to suggest that if one dislikes reading 
enough then they can still opt for punishment rather than actually doing the reading. 
Granted this is not the kind of all-encompassing freedom of choice that we may 
want, but still represents a sufficient amount of choice to maintain some kind of 
autonomy in the learning process, even if it is somewhat curtailed by having to 
choose the ‘lesser of two evils’ in some instances. 
Such a theory can be readily transposed to our current examination of 
educative processes that are designed to promote autonomy. As has been mentioned 
earlier basic educational skills such as basic standards of literacy and numeracy are 
essential if we are to be able to pursue (or discontinue) certain avenues of education: 
after all for a choice to be autonomous, it must also be informed. How then might we 
at the very least reduce the imposition of will on students who do not desire to study 
such fundamental skills and knowledge? 
For the self-determination theorist, this is achieved through appealing to the 
right kind of motivations within an individual, and using these to inspire learning. 
As was mentioned above, the spectrum of autonomy in learning ranges from external 
to intrinsic - but it is here that the fundamental error within SDT is revealed. It is not 
prima facie true that intrinsic motivations somehow trump a desire to attain extrinsic 
rewards in the autonomy game, so to speak. If it is the element of deliberative choice 
that we value in a system of autonomy, then surely inviting a student to measure up 
inculcating agency 
266       childhood & philosophy, rio de janeiro, v. 13, n. 27, maio-ago. 2017, pp. 253-270       issn 1984-5987 
the pros and cons of working at something they do not enjoy on the basis that they 
will get something perhaps unrelated to the endeavour by way of remuneration is 
every bit as autonomous as relying on the fact that they enjoy the task itself, or that 
they see the inherent value in doing so? Simply stating that valuing something for its 
intrinsic value is preferable to the imposition of external factors to motivate learning 
does little to prove that this is more autonomous, one may even argue that if one 
cannot help but enjoy something, then the decision to undertake that task (even if we 
believe that doing so is fundamentally valuable to the individual doing so) is 
considerably less autonomous than deliberating on whether or not we see a certain 
amount of self-sacrifice as worthwhile to achieve an extrinsic aim. Furthermore, if 
we are to point at the neural networks responsible for motivation, it seems even less 
likely that the SD theorist’s claims bear any weight - since there is much evidence to 
suggest that one’s responses to both intrinsic and extrinsic reward are processed in 
the same way (KOMLOSI et al., 2012; NIEWENHUIS et al., 2005; IZUMA, SAITO, 
SADATO, 2008). Granted, it may well be better if someone does see the value of the 
task they are performing in and of itself, but it is not clear that offering incentives 
(provided that we do not coerce or threaten sanctions) undermines autonomy, or is a 
lower-order motivation as SDT suggests. 
 
moral education 
We have seen above that when talking about fundamental educational aims, 
it is how we are able to live, and not our proficiency at exams, essays, or our ability 
to write a thesis, that is the indictor of a good education. Thus, the goals of a good 
educative system should be aimed at living a good life and the inauguration into 
that which is considered good. Moral aptitude is clearly part of what is required for 
such a life and so a moral education is hugely important. Again we must be able to 
educate individuals in becoming morally autonomous agents in an autonomous 
way. Being able to educate in morality does of course imply that some level of 
expertise in moral matters is possible, and although there is much to be said on the 
subject of whether or not such a thing is possible (SINGER, 1996; MILL, 2005; 
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FEINBERG, 1997; PLATO, 1993) I will for the sake of moving onto how morality may 
be autonomously inculcated assume that such expertise is indeed possible. 
Assuming that it is possible to achieve moral knowledge, one must ask how 
we may facilitate the development of such knowledge in line with the principles of 
educative autonomy that have been outlined. We must consider too the thought that 
acting morally, certainly in the case of acting in line with laws, is constituted by pre-
determined rules of some kind. Reconciling these two notions seems by no means an 
easy task – but this is not to say an impossible one. 
Durkheim defends the above view that “there is an aspect common to all 
behavior that we...call moral. All such behavior conforms to pre-established rules. To 
conduct one’s self morally is a matter of abiding by a norm, determining what 
conduct should obtain in a given instance even before one is required to act” 
(DURKHEIM, 1961, p. 23) Given this outline of moral behaviour it seems hard to 
suggest any way in which we may be able to inculcate morality in an autonomous 
fashion – instead being lead into making children learn by rote those things which 
are and are not prohibited in the setting in which they find themselves. 
But, if we employ our earlier notion of authentic education, a reply to 
Durkheim emerges. In order to facilitate autonomy it appears that we need to forego 
it in the present to ensure it develops in the future. Far from breaking the rule of 
honouring the agency of others however, if an educative process is authentic and the 
agent upon whom we are inculcating knowledge is an undeveloped one, we foster 
such agency - leading the agent from an undeveloped to a developed state. 
The thought that we need to teach before we facilitate autonomous learning is 
even more pronounced when we are talking about moral education. In any form of 
education, but particularly moral education, at least some standard knowledge of 
relevant concepts is essential for us to be able to grapple with moral questions at all.  
Any sort of originality of thought is then only possible once one has grasped a 
sufficient amount of the basics as it were. But simple mastery of the provenance of 
morality is nowhere near enough if we are to be able to become morally developed 
agents capable of thinking and acting in morally autonomous ways.  Of course, we 
must analyse such concepts in order for us to “establish rationally, what faith 
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postulates a priori” (DURKHEIM, 1961, p.115). Yet even if we are able to learn and 
analyse the rules of morality, this still doesn’t quite seem enough. We cannot simply 
learn the rules of morality by rote and analyse them. “To know by roat is no perfect 
knowledge, but to keep what one hath committed to his memories charge, is 
commendable: what a man directly knoweth, that he will dispose-of, without turning 
to his booke or looking to his pattern” (MONTAIGNE, 1886, p. 65 – Italics added). 
There is then, a performative aspect to displaying moral autonomy – we must not 
just treat morality as an academic subject – it is a subject for Seneca’s ‘learning for 
life’. Such a performative element may be Aristotle’s virtuous person, acting in 
morally ‘good’ ways, or the autonomous orator of which Kant speaks. 
Regarding the indoctrinative aspect of moral education, we must of course 
avoid the temptation to prescribe which moral theory young people choose to adopt, 
even if we have strong reasons to prefer one conception of the ‘right path’ over 
another. What then are we to take as a common aspect to all moral thought, 
regardless of it’s particular doctrine? A compelling suggestion in this regard may be 
that an important characteristic of action that may be described as moral rests on the 
potential for self-sacrifice. That is to say that we are prepared to risk, or actually 
suffer, some kind of personal detriment in order to comply to our own internal 
system of values. If we are morally motivated by seeing an act as valuable because we 
enjoy the feeling of doing ‘good’ (whatever that conception may mean to us) then we 
are reduced to the realm of Nagel’s moral luck (NAGEL, 1979). In terms of being 
said to hold a moral code autonomously, to be able to acknowledge that a certain 
course of action may be considerably less than rewarding to us personally, yet still 
maintain that such an action be taken because it is the right thing to do, shows a level 
of deliberation and choice that is the very essence of autonomous thought. So too is 
it the case that if we do not regard a moral principle - especially one that has been 
suggested to us by others - as important enough to endure such self-detriment, then 
we are able to autonomously reject that which we have been taught. In such a case, 
we may seek a new mode of moral thought in which we do see reasons to undergo 
such self-sacrifice in order to uphold fundamental tenets which guide our action. 
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It seems that the only way in which we are able to facilitate the skills needed 
for individuals to be autonomous moral agents is to teach them the fundamental 
tenets that they will need in order to both understand the provenance of morality 
and to inculcate the critical spirit that is so important to furnish them with the ability 
to autonomously reject those ways of thinking and the rules that are prescribed. 
Since morality also has a performative element, we must give children the 
opportunity to practise moral decisions if we are to expect them to achieve the ability 
to do so effectively in future. Only then can we be said to have given the child an 
authentic and autonomous moral education. The reason why such an education is so 
important is because it is the autonomous action of a developed agent that is central 
to the praise-/blame-worthiness of any act. If such autonomy ceases to exist, or at 
the very least we ignore our perfect and imperfect obligations (O’NEILL, 1997) to 
inculcate such autonomy in agents, then it renders prescriptive statements and 
censure of acts meaningless. 
Given the importance that has been continually placed upon being able (both 
in regards to competence and opportunity) to exercise our autonomy, this paper has 
dealt with how, ideally, we may try and ensure that as many individuals as possible 
attain developed agency. We have also seen that although inculcating agency is to 
some degree necessary, that to do so in a way that does not compromise or 
undermine autonomy is something that not only makes sense, but is also possible. 
We have also discussed how this very endeavour itself may be developed in a way 
that is sensitive to the current autonomy of any individual we are hoping to educate. 
Most importantly, we have identified the features of indoctrination, and seen why 
we must be committed to avoiding this at all costs. 
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